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CASENOTES
TORRES V. OAKLAND SCAVENGER Co.: WHAT'S IN A NAME? -
EVERYTHING IN A FEDERAL APPEAL
AFTER RECEIVING notice pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment, Jose Torres and fifteen other plaintiffs intervened in an
employment discrimination suit against Oakland Scavenger Com-
pany.1 "On August 31, 1981, the District Court for the Northern
District of California dismissed the complaint . . . for failure to
state a claim warranting relief."2 About a month later, a notice of
appeal was filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Torres' name, however, was omitted
from both the notice of appeal and the order of the court of ap-
peals. The omission in the notice of appeal was the result of a
clerical error by his attorney's secretary.3
On remand, Oakland Scavenger "moved for partial summary
judgment on the ground that the prior judgment of dismissal was
final as to [Torres] by virtue of his failure to appeal."4 Oakland
Scavenger's motion was granted by the district court and affirmed
by the court of appeals. Certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court in order to resolve the "conflict in the Cir-
cuits over whether a failure to file a notice of appeal in accordance
with the specificity requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 3(c) presents a jurisdictional bar to the appeal."' The Su-
preme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure bar courts of appeals
from exercising jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the time
for filing a notice of appeal has passed.'
1. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2408.
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This Note will discuss some of the cases that have attempted
to interpret Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c). Then it
will examine the Torres decision and the manner in which the
justices reached their results. Finally, this Note will analyze the
opinions in the Torres case, concluding that, while the holding of
that case may be correct, the majority fails to adequately justify
the result.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Rule
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) provides that
"[t] he notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the
appeal . . . ."I A 1979 amendment to the Rule states that "[a]n
appeal shall not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the
notice of appeal."8 Although most of the federal appellate courts
have agreed that the failure to specify the parties to the appeal is
more than an "informality of form or title," the courts have dis-
agreed as to whether there can be exceptions to the requirement
that the parties be specified. 9
B. Foman v. Davis:10 The Supreme Court Interprets Another
Provision of Rule 3(c)
The Supreme Court, prior to Torres, had not addressed the
requirement that parties to an appeal be specified. In Foman v.
Davis, however, the Court did address a separate provision of
Rule 3(c) which requires that a notice of appeal "shall designate
the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from . . . ."" In
Foman, a plaintiff whose complaint was dismissed by the district
court filed motions to vacate the judgment and to amend his com-
plaint.' 2 Before the court ruled on these motions, he filed a notice
of appeal from the dismissal. When the district court finally de-
nied his motions, he filed a second notice of appeal from the de-
nial. The court of appeals held that his first appeal was prema-
ture, and the second notice of appeal failed to specify that the
7. FED. R. App. P. 3(c).
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
10. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
11. FED. R. App. P. 3(c).
12. Foman, 371 U.S. at 179.
[Vol. 39:943
TORRES V. OAKLAND SCAVENGER CO.
appeal was being taken from the dismissal of the complaint "as
well as the orders denying the motions."' 3
The Supreme Court, however, held that the second appeal
was improperly denied because it is "entirely contrary to the spirit
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits
to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities."'1 4 The
Court noted that the "defect in the second notice of appeal did not
mislead or prejudice the respondent,"' 15 and stated that the Fed-
eral Rules "'reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill
1"16
C. The Liberal Construction of Rule 3(c) in the Federal
Appellate Courts
Although the Supreme Court had never before considered the
issue presented in Torres, a number of federal appellate courts
had addressed the issue and held that failure to meet the specific-
ity requirement of Rule 3(c) does not necessarily bar an appeal.
In Williams v. Frey,"7 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether two parties who were not named in the notices of
appeal should be considered as appellants. The court, with little
discussion, included the parties as appellants, "since there would
be no prejudice to the defendants in doing so." ' The court merely
explained that "appellees have . . . considered them [as appel-
lants] at all stages of this appeal . . . [and] appellees' brief en-
compasses the issues of substance decided here."' 9
In Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,20 the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed whether Takashi Namiki, an original plaintiff, had aban-
doned his appeal because he was not named in the notice of ap-
peal which read: "Joanne Ayres, et al., Plaintiffs above named
. . . from the Final Judgment entered in this action .. .. ",I' The
court stated that it joined other circuits which permit, "in limited
instances, appeals by parties not named in the notice of appeal."22
13. Id. at 180-81.
14. Id. at 181.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).
17. 551 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1977).
18. Id. at 934 n.1.
19. Id.
20. 789 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1986).
21. Id. at 1177.
22. Id.
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The court noted:
Those circuits giving a broader application to Rule 3(c) have
done so when satisfied that there was no surprise, detrimental
reliance, or prejudice to appellees because one or more parties
had not been listed by name in the notice of appeal. Typically,
the cases involved an identity of issues in the appeals of the
named and unnamed appellants.2"
The court held that the use of "et al." in the notice of appeal
provided "no basis for surprise, detrimental reliance, or prejudice
to appellees. '24 Therefore, Namiki's appeal was not barred.
Less than one month before Torres was decided, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a liberal construction of Rule
3(c) in Hays v. Sony Corp. of America.25 In Hays, the plaintiffs
sued Sony Corp. for copyright infringement. The plaintiffs lost,
and the district judge awarded Sony close to $15,000 in sanctions
against the plaintiffs' attorney. A notice of appeal was filed, speci-
fying only the plaintiffs as appellants. The plaintiffs could not ap-
peal the award of sanctions, however, because it only granted re-
lief against the attorney, not the plaintiffs themselves. The
attorney argued that the notice of appeal was adequate as to his
appeal of the sanctions. The appeals court held that "[w]here
there is no possibility that the appellant's violation of Rule 3(c)
misled the appellee, . . . the violation is harmless and forfeiture of
the appeal an excessive sanction."2 6 Since Sony admitted it knew
that plaintiffs' counsel was attempting to appeal the sanctions as
well as the dismissal of the copyright suit, the court held that the
appeal was properly before it.21
In Harrison v. United States,2" a joint notice of appeal from
a decision against eleven plaintiffs in eight consolidated personal
injury and wrongful death actions failed to specify Billy Harrison
as an appellant. After noting that "[s]everal courts have held that
a party not specifically named in the notice of appeal may not be
deemed an appellant,"29 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that "in certain extreme cases, [Rule] 3 has been construed
more liberally, to allow a party not named as an appellant in a
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
26. Id. at 414.
27. Id.
28. 715 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 1312.
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notice of appeal to appeal." 30 The court, analogizing the facts to
Williams v. Frey, held that this situation was one of those "cer-
tain extreme cases."'" The court noted that Harrison's name was
omitted by mistake, the notice of appeal was timely for the consol-
idated cases, the issues were common to all plaintiffs, and the
United States did not allege prejudice. 2
D. The Strict Construction of Rule 3(c) in the Federal
Appellate Courts
Not all of the federal appellate courts have adopted a liberal
construction of Rule 3(c). One of the leading cases which adopted
a strict construction of the rule is Van Hoose v. Eidson.33 Van
Hoose involved an appeal from a district court decision denying
relief to four plaintiffs who had been suspended from school for
violating a "hair code." The notice of appeal named only Floyd
Van Hoose as an appellant, along with the phrase "et al." 31 In a
short opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that under
Rule 3(c), Floyd Van Hoose was the only appellant recognized in
the case because he was the only party specified. The court stated
that "[t]he term 'et al.' does not inform any other party or any
court as to which of the plaintiffs desire to appeal in this case.
This is more than a clerical error."'35
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Van Hoose while
adopting a strict construction of Rule 3(c) in Farley Transporta-
tion Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.36 In Farley, an an-
titrust case, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the appeal of Farley Terminal, because the company was not
named in the notice of appeal.3 The court stated that Rule 3(c)
creates a jurisdictional requirement and that Foman v. Davis does
not apply in situations where a jurisdictional bar is raised to an
appeal. The court reasoned that:
Adopting a purely "equitable" approach to applying the [Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure] would result in unpredict-
ability and defeat the purpose of the rules, which is to promote
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 450 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1971).
34. Id. at 747.
35. Id.
36. 778 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
37. Id. at 1368.
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the orderly resolution of disputes and to discourage dilatory
practices . . . . Furthermore, in multiparty litigation it is
important that the notice specify which of the parties is taking an
appeal. 8
II. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Company
A. Majority Opinion
In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., Justice Marshall wrote
the opinion for the majority in an eight to one decision.39 In inter-
preting Rule 3(c), Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he failure to
name a party in a notice of appeal is more than excusable 'infor-
mality;' it constitutes a failure of that party to appeal."'40
Marshall noted that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2
gives courts of appeals the power, "for 'good cause shown,' to 'sus-
pend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a par-
ticular case on application of a party or on its own motion.' "941
Marshall, however, pointed out that Rule 26(b) contains specific
exceptions to that grant of equitable discretion. One such excep-
tion forbids a court from "'enlarg [ing]' the time limits for filing a
notice of appeal."42 Marshall reasoned that allowing "courts to
exercise jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the time for filing
a notice of appeal has passed is equivalent to permitting courts to
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. ' 43 Therefore, he ar-
gued, the Rules do not grant the courts power to exercise jurisdic-
tion over parties not named in the notice of appeal.
Marshall also looked at the Advisory Committee Note follow-
ing Rule 3, which states that "'[b]ecause the timely filing of a
notice of appeal is "mandatory and jurisdictional," compliance
38. Id. at 1369. See also Covington v. Allsbrook, 636 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1980). In
Covington, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals of two prison in-
mates who had initially brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, "because they did not sign the
notice of appeal and therefore did not comply with the provisions of Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 3(c)." Id. at 63. This court also cited Van Hoose and interpreted that case
to "limit appellate jurisdiction to those parties who are actually named in the notice of
appeal." Id.
39. 108 S. Ct. 2405 (1988). Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, while Justice
Brennan filed a dissenting opinion.
40. Id. at 2407.
41. Id. (quoting FED. R. App. P. 2).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2408.
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with the provisions of those rules is of the utmost importance.' ,4
Marshall concluded that weight should be given to the fact that
the "Advisory Committee viewed the requirements of Rule 3 as
jurisdictional in nature .... ",,5
Marshall also distinguished Foman v. Davis from Torres:
Foman did not address whether the requirement of Rule 3(c) at
issue in that case was jurisdictional in nature; rather, the Court
simply concluded that in light of all the circumstances, the rule
had been complied with. We do not dispute the important prin-
ciple. . . that the requirements of the rules of procedure should
be liberally construed and that 'mere technicalities' should not
stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits ....
But although a court may construe the rules liberally in deter-
mining whether they have been complied with, it may not waive
the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4. . . if it finds
that they have not been met.4
Marshall claimed that the petitioner in Torres would fail to
comply with the Rule 3(c) specificity requirement even if it were
liberally construed.47 Marshall also concluded that the use of the
phrase "et al." in the notice of appeal was not sufficient to indi-
cate Torres' intention to appeal. "The specificity requirement of
Rule 3(c) is met only by some designation that gives fair notice of
the specific individual or entity seeking to appeal." 48
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia authored the concurring opinion in Torres. He
argued that the majority used too much language advocating a
liberal construction of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.4 9
The principle that "mere technicalities" should not stand in the
way of deciding a case on the merits is more a prescription for
ignoring the Federal Rules than a useful guide to their construc-
tion and application. By definition all rules of procedure are
technicalities; sanction for failure to comply with them always
prevents the court from deciding where justice lies in the partic-
ular case, on the theory that securing a fair and orderly process
enables more justice to be done in the totality of cases. It seems
44. Id. (quoting FED. R. App. P. 3 advisory commitee note (citation omitted)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2408-09.
47. Id. at 2409.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2409-10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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to me, moreover, that we should seek to interpret the Rules
neither liberally nor stingily, but only, as best we can, according
to their apparent intent."
Scalia argued that Rule 3(c) was intended to be strictly applied.
He pointed out that the Rule requires the appellant to "specify
the . . . parties taking the appeal," which implies that more than
a designation of "et al." is required.5 1 He also argued that since
the Rule specifies that "informality of form or title" would not
require dismissal, it is likely "that a strict application was gener-
ally contemplated." 52
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated that
"[n]othing in the Federal Rules . . . compels such a [strict] con-
struction of Rule 3(c), which I believe to be wholly at odds with
the liberal policies underlying those rules, as well as our own prior
construction of them." 53 Brennan began his analysis with the
"broad equitable discretion" granted by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 2, which permits appellate courts, upon a showing of
good cause, to suspend the requirements of any rule except Rule
26(b).5 4 Rule 26(b) only prohibits appellate courts from extending
the time limits for filing a notice of appeal as set out in Rule 4,
while permitting time extensions for any other act provided in the
rules.5 "Notably," Brennan commented that "neither [Rules
26(b) or 2] mentions Rule 3(c) as falling outside the purview of
this broad equitable power."56
Next, Brennan attacked the majority's argument that "Rule
3(c)'s party-specification requirement must be deemed jurisdic-
tional, for the 'mandatory nature of the time limits contained in
Rule 4 would be vitiated if courts of appeals were permitted to
exercise jurisdiction over parties not named in the notice of ap-
peal.' "5 Brennan argued that:
This unsupported assertion, however, is only correct if we as-
50. Id. at 2410.
51. Id. (quoting Rule 3(c)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2410 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2411 (quoting majority opinion in Torres, 108 S. Ct. at 2408).
950 [Vol. 39:943
TORRES V. OAKLAND SCAVENGER CO.
sume the answer to the question at issue here, i.e., that "[t]he
failure to name a party in a notice of appeal . . . constitutes a
failure of that party to appeal." . . . If, on the other hand, we
assume . . . that an unnamed party effectively appeals where a
notice is timely filed and the unnamed party's intention to join
in the appeal is clear to all and prejudicial to
none, . . . then Rule 4's mandatory time limitations would re-
main inviolate.58
Therefore, Brennan claimed that the necessity of enlarging the
time requirements of Rule 4 does not arise until a court deter-
mines that the failure to specify an appellant means that that ap-
pellant did not appeal.59
Brennan also criticized the majority's reliance on the Advi-
sory Committee Notes, arguing that the provisions the Court cited
did not necessarily deal with the part of Rule 3(c) that was at
issue.6 0 Further, he claimed that the Court's broad reading of the
Notes was inconsistent with Foman v. Davis. Although the major-
ity claimed that Foman dealt with a mere technical noncompli-
ance, Brennan argued that "both the notice here and in Foman
omitted precisely the information required by Rule 3(c)." 1 Bren-
nan claimed that in Foman, however, the Court treated the second
notice of appeal as effective because the petitioner's intent to ap-
peal was clear.6 2
Finally, Brennan criticized the Court's "inflexible rule of con-
venience" on policy grounds:
After today's ruling, appellees will be able to capitalize on mere
clerical errors and secure the dismissal of unnamed appellants
no matter how meritorious the appellant's claims and no matter
how obvious the appellant's intention to seek appellate review,
and courts of appeals will be powerless to correct even the most
manifest of resulting injustices. The Court identifies no policy
supporting, let alone requiring, this harsh rule, which I believe is
patently inconsistent not only with the liberal spirit underlying
the Federal Rules, but with Rule 2's express authorization per-
mitting courts of appeals to forgive noncompliance where good
cause for such forgiveness is shown.63
58. Id. (quoting majority opinion in Torres, 108 S. Ct. at 2407).
59. Id. at 2411.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2412.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2412-13.
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Brennan concluded that the case should be reversed and remanded
to find out if the court below or the respondents were apprised
that the petitioner intended to join the appeal of the fifteen other
plaintiffs.
III. ANALYSIS
All three opinions in Torres focus on the intent of the body
which adopted the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to deter-
mine what sanction should apply when an appealing party fails to
be named in the notice of appeal, without carefully considering
the policy behind a strict application versus a liberal application.
The thrust of the majority's argument is that Rule 26(b) bars a
court from enlarging the time limits for filing a notice of appeal.
The majority reasoned that allowing a party to be added to the
notice of appeal would enlarge such time limits, and therefore, a
strict reading of Rule 3(c) is required. As Brennan explained, the
Court assumed that adding a party to an appeal extends the time
limit for filing a notice of appeal. The purpose of Rule 26(b) ap-
pears to be to assure that notice is given to the respondent within
a reasonable time that the opposing party is appealing. If a notice
of appeal is filed, and the respondent assumes that all parties from
the lower court are appealing and is not prejudiced, the purpose of
Rule 26(b) is served. Therefore, the majority's assumption that
adding a party to the appeal extends the time limits for filing a
notice of appeal is weak. The majority should have explained the
reasons behind such an assumption before basing its decision on it.
Also, the majority attempted to distinguish Foman from
Torres by stating that Foman dealt with a different portion of
Rule 3(c) than Torres and thus was not controlling. Although the
Court correctly asserted that Foman did not control, such a dis-
tinction opens many questions. When will Foman's analysis that
the Federal Rules "reject the approach that pleading is a game of
skill"64 be applied to a case, rather than Torres' analysis that a
court "may not waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 3
and 4" ?65 Indeed, Scalia's concurring opinion criticized the Torres
majority for simultaneously embracing and rejecting the Foman
rationale. The majority provided little guidance as to what is and
what is not a jurisdictional requirement. Scalia has a strong argu-
64. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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ment that since the actual language of the Rule requires the ap-
pellant to "specify the . . . parties," then more than the designa-
tion "et al." is required. 68 The Rule does appear to require the
parties to be named, but that does not necessarily require one
sanction over another.
Because the actual intent of Rule 3(c) appears to be some-
what ambiguous, the majority should have addressed some policy
arguments to support its conclusion. As Brennan stated, "[t]he
Court identifies no policy supporting, let alone requiring this harsh
rule . ". .. , Brennan's policy arguments against a strict applica-
tion of Rule 3(c) focused on the belief that courts of appeals
should have the power to correct injustices. Also, he argued that
one party should not be allowed to capitalize on clerical errors
where the other party has a meritorious claim and an obvious in-
tention to appeal.68
Although the majority did not give policy reasons for a strict
construction, Justice Scalia provided some in his concurring opin-
ion. "By definition all rules of procedure are technicalities; sanc-
tion for failure to comply with them always prevents the court
from deciding where justice lies in the particular case, on the the-
ory that securing a fair and orderly process enables more justice
to be done in the totality of cases."6 Scalia's policy argument is
strong support for the majority holding. Rules are set up jo pro-
vide fairness in the majority of cases and to prevent the chaos that
would result if each situation were evaluated individually. The
Court, however, failed to use this argument to support its decision.
Instead, it based its decision on tenuous interpretations of Rule
3(c) and Rule 26(b). Finally, the Court failed to provide the
means to predict when a Torres strict application of the Rules will
be applied, and when a Foman liberal application will be applied.
With no policy reasons behind its decision, the Court failed to give
guidelines as to which Rules of Appellate Procedure will be inter-
preted to provide fairness in the individual case, and which Rules
will be interpreted to aid the flow of the administration of justice.
JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
67. Torres, 108 S. Ct. at 2412.
68. Id. at 2412-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2410 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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